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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence frameworks should allow for ever more autonomous and gen-
eral systems in contrast to very narrow and restricted (human pre-defined) domain
systems, in analogy to how the brain works. Self-constructive Artificial Intelligence
(SCAI) is one such possible framework. We herein propose that SCAI is based on
three principles of organization: self-growing, self-experimental and self-repairing. Self-
growing: the ability to autonomously and incrementally construct structures and func-
tionality as needed to solve encountered (sub)problems. Self-experimental: the ability
to internally simulate, anticipate and take decisions based on these expectations. Self-
repairing: the ability to autonomously re-construct a previously successful function-
ality or pattern of interaction lost from a possible sub-component failure (damage).
To implement these principles of organization, a constructive architecture capable of
evolving adaptive autonomous agents is required. We present Schema-based learning
as one such architecture capable of incrementally constructing a myriad of internal
models of three kinds: predictive schemas, dual (inverse models) schemas and goal
schemas as they are necessary to autonomously develop increasing functionality.
We claim that artificial systems, whether in the digital or in the physical world, can
benefit very much form this constructive architecture and should be organized around
these principles of organization. To illustrate the generality of the proposed framework,
we include several test cases in structural adaptive navigation in artificial intelligence
systems in Paper II of this series, and resilient robot motor control in Paper III of this
series. Paper IV of this series will also include SCAI for problem structural discovery
in predictive Business Intelligence.
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1 Introduction
As it is generally accepted, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is intelligence exhibited by machines, in
contrast with the natural intelligence displayed by humans and other animals (Wikipedia). In
computer science, an ideal ”intelligent” machine is a flexible rational agent that perceives its envi-
ronment and takes actions that maximize its chance of success at some goal (Legg & Hutter, 2007;
Nilsson, 1998; Russell & Norvig, 2010). The central problems (or goals) of AI research include rea-
soning, knowledge, planning, learning, natural language processing (communication), perception
and the ability to move and manipulate objects (Luger & Stubblefield 2004; Nilsson 1998; Poole,
Mackworth & Goebel 1998; Russell & Norvig 2010). General intelligence is among the field’s long-
term goals (Kurzweil, 1999; 2005; Goertzel, 2014), thus, artificial Intelligence frameworks should
allow for ever more autonomous and general systems in contrast to very narrow and restricted do-
main operating systems, in analogy to how the brain works. This paper presents Self-constructive
Artificial Intelligence (SCAI) as one such possible framework for artificial general intelligence.
Integrative paradigms based on agents (Nilsson, 1998; Rusell & Norvig, 2010) are becoming a
central thrust of research in AI. In this regard, section 1.4 presents the agent-based paradigm. In
adaptive agents, learning must be an integral aspect of all the AI components (Nilsson, 1998) and
not an add-on component, as it is reflected in many frameworks for the design of AI agents (Albus,
2001; Bach, 2009; Goertzel et al., 2010; Hawkins, 2004; 2007; Kurzweil, 2012; Rosenbloom, 2013).
At the most advanced level, autonomous learning from the environment (Shen, 1994) becomes a
central ingredient. There are nowadays several cases where autonomy is already playing a central
role. A couple of representative examples include: self-learning, referring to ever more autonomous
machine learning and self-driving, referring to autonomous vehicle navigation.
To illustrate the generality of the proposed framework, we include several test cases in struc-
tural adaptive navigation in artificial intelligence systems, and resilient robot motor control. Part
II of this series of papers will also include SCAI for problem structural discovery in Business
Intelligence. In this paper we introduce three very different test cases to prove the generality of
the SCAI framework. Navigation in physical space is becoming paradigmatic (cf. self-driving in
autonomous vehicles). We develop structural adaptive navigation to exemplify SCAI in an incre-
mental evolutionary AI. We have already taken some of these aspects to Robotics (Weitzenfeld,
Arkin, Cervantes-Perez, Olivares & Corbacho, 1998). For more detail on some of the test cases
we provide a more detailed description elsewhere (Corbacho & Arbib, 2019; Sanchez-Montanes
& Corbacho, 2019). Next, we develop a case in resilient motor control where a previously reach
and grip behavior is re-constructed after a break-up of the structure and functionality has taken
place. In Part II of this series of papers, we also present structural Learning for autonomous
problem structural decomposition as an ingredient of SCAI. Real world problems typically present
a complex structure. Much of the work of the researcher consists of uncovering this underlying
structure which allows to decompose the problem into easier to cope with and solve sub-problems.
Subsequently, each specific subproblem has a particular scope and boundary conditions.
1.1 Artificial General Intelligence, Developmental and Evolution-
ary Artificial Intelligence
As already expressed, general intelligence is among the field’s long-term goals (Kurzweil, 1999;
2005). In this regard, SCAI is a framework for general intelligence in contrast to very narrow
and restricted domains of application. Artificial Intelligence frameworks should allow for ever
more autonomous and general systems in contrast to very narrow and restricted domain operating
systems, in analogy to how the brain works. Self-constructive Artificial Intelligence (SCAI) is one
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such possible framework.
As Goertzel and Pennachin (2007) expressed, in recent years a broad community of researchers
has emerged, focusing on the original ambitious goals of the AI field - the creation and study
of software or hardware systems with general intelligence comparable to, and ultimately perhaps
greater than, that of human beings. Goertzel (2010; 2014) review approaches to defining the
concept of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) including mathematical formalisms, engineering,
and biology inspired perspectives. The spectrum of designs for AGI systems includes systems
with symbolic, emergentist, hybrid and universalist characteristics. The question is how to best
conceptualize and approach the original problem regarding which the AI field was founded, that
is, the creation of thinking machines with general intelligence comparable to, or greater than, that
of human beings. The standard approach of the AI discipline (Russell and Norvig, 2010), as it has
evolved in the six decades since the fields founding, views artificial intelligence largely in terms of
the pursuit of discrete capabilities or specific practical tasks. But while this approach has yielded
many interesting technologies and theoretical results, it has proved relatively unsuccessful in terms
of the original central goals of the field.
In this regard, Ray Kurzweil (Kurzweil, 2005) has used the term narrow AI to refer to the
creation of systems that carry out specific intelligent behaviors in specific contexts. For a narrow AI
system, if one changes the context or the behavior specification even a little bit, some level of human
reprogramming or reconfiguration is generally necessary to enable the system to retain its level of
intelligence. This is quite different from natural generally intelligent systems like humans, which
have a broad capability to self-adapt to changes in their goals or circumstances, performing transfer
learning (Taylor, Kuhlmann, and Stone, 2008) to generalize knowledge from one goal or context
to others. The concept of Artificial General Intelligence has emerged as an antonym to narrow
AI, to refer to systems with this sort of broad generalization capability. The AGI approach takes
general intelligence as a fundamentally distinct property from task or problem specific capabilities,
and focuses directly on understanding this property and creating systems that display it. One
of the long term goals of general intelligence is achieving commonsense knowledge. We claim
that commonsense knowledge is reached by self-experienced/self-experimented knowledge and is
grounded by sensorimotor interactions with the world, much as a ten-years old child has developed
its commonsense knowledge of the world (Nilsson, 1998). For this SCAI at the subsymbolic level is
needed to be able to ground concepts in the real world represented by signals. We will later show
this in several examples on navigation and motor control implemented by schemas operating over
signals.
SCAI is also developmental intelligence. A clear early example of developmental AI is developed
by Drescher (1991). He described a theory of how a computer program might be implemented to
learn and use new concepts that have not been previously programmed into it. Drescher described
the schema mechanism, a general learning and concept-building mechanism (at the symbolic level)
inspired by Jean Piaget’s account of human cognitive development (Piaget, 1954), The schema
mechanism is intended to replicate key aspects of cognitive development during infancy. It takes
Piaget’s theory of human development as source of inspiration for an artificial learning mechanism;
and it extends and tests Piaget’s theory by checking whether a specific mechanism that works
according to Piagetian themes actually exhibits Piagetian abilitiehe schema mechanism learns from
its experiences, expressing discoveries in its existing representational vocabulary, and extending
that vocabulary with new concepts. A novel empirical learning technique, marginal attribution,
can find results of an action that are obscure because each occurs rarely in general, although
reliably under certain conditions. Drescher shows that several early milestones in the Piagetian
infant’s invention of the concept of persistent object can be replicated by the schema mechanism.
A related field of study, developmental robotics, sometimes called epigenetic robotics, is a sci-
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entific field which aims at studying the developmental mechanisms, architectures and constraints
that allow lifelong and open-ended learning of new skills and new knowledge in embodied ma-
chines. As in human children, learning is expected to be cumulative and of progressively increasing
complexity, and to result from self-exploration of the world in combination with social interaction.
Internal Models (described in later sections) and dynamic representations (Weng et al., 2001) play
a significant role in autonomous developmental robotics. They are mechanisms able to represent
the input-output characteristics of the sensorimotor loop. In developmental robotics, open-ended
learning of skills and knowledge serves the purpose of reaction to unexpected inputs, to explore the
environment and to acquire new behaviors. The development of the robot includes self-exploration
of the state-action space and learning of the environmental dynamics (Smith-Bize, 2016)
SCAI is also evolutionary AI (Nilsson, 1998). In this regard, developmental robotics (DR) is
related to, but differs from, evolutionary robotics (ER). ER uses populations of robots that evolve
over time, whereas DR is interested in how the organization of a single robot’s control system
develops through experience, over time. In this regard work from Rana computatrix (Arbib, 1987;
Corbacho & Arbib, 1996) to Rattus computator (Guazzelli, Corbacho, Bota & Arbib, 1998) provides
an example of evolutionary AI in which certain principles of sensorimotor integration are taken and
evolved from models of amphibian behavior to the world of mammals (concretely to rodents). This
paper in the series presents SCAI principles of organization that can be already found in navigation
and motor control present in amphibian and, hence, are also present and are the basis for more
complex behaviors in mammals (Paper III in this series).
1.2 Self-constructive Brain
We have already proposed that the emergence of adaptive behavior in animals arises from the self-
constructive nature of the brain (Corbacho, 2016). The brain builds itself up by reflecting on its
particular interactions with the environment, that is, it constructs its own interpretation of reality
through the construction of representations of relevant predictive patterns of sensorimotor inter-
action. Thus, we presented the brain as the architect of its own reality, that is, the brains builds
reality rather than simply observing it. We introduce the predictive (forward internal models) and
its associated dual schemas as active processes capturing relevant patterns of sensorimotor inter-
action; and we suggest that the brain is composed of myriads of these patterns. These predictive
internal models exist all over the brain and a variety of examples can be found in the literature
regarding different brain areas/functionalities (cf. literature on the predictive brain: Clark, 2013;
Corbacho, 2016).
We have proposed that the brain is self-constructive (SCB) since it is self-experimental, self-
growing, and self-repairing. The brain is self-experimental since to ensure survival the self-constructive
brain is an active machine capable of performing experiments of its own interactions with the en-
vironment as well as capable of mentally simulating the results of those interactions in order to
be able to later decide the most optimal course of action. In this regard, the way for our brain to
fully understand anything is to model and simulate it. To survive it must anticipate since antici-
pating an event allows to better prepare for it, since it allows the animal/agent to get ready to act
immediately with the most successful course of action possible. Anticipation plays an important
role in directing intelligent behavior under a fundamental hypothesis that the brain constructs
reality as much as it embodies it. Hence, the anticipatory nature of the brain is a clear ingredi-
ent necessary for the SCB. The brain is also self-growing, since it dynamically and incrementally
constructs internal structures in order to build a model of the world as it gathers statistics. To
do so, it incrementally recruits and then adapts different neural circuitry that implements different
behavioral modules (schemas). Finally, the brain is also self-repairing, since to survive, it must also
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be robust and capable of self-organization and self-repair, that is, the brain is capable of finding
ways to repair parts of previously working structures and hence re-construct a previous successful
pattern of interaction. This is the case when brain lesions occur.
These are evolutionary principles that have evolved in many different species, not just in mam-
mals. That is, these principles can be clearly observed at different levels of abstraction and simple
implementations can be found even in lower vertebrates. So, for instance, amphibian brain capacity
for recovering a behavioral pattern of interaction after a critical lesion demonstrates their capacity
for self-repair. Self-experimental and self-growing, on the other hand, can also be tested by their
ability to learn certain problems such as learning to detour through the use of internal models.
1.3 Agent-based Artificial Intelligence
Nilsson (1998) provides a synthetic view of AI based on agents. In this regard, artificial intelligence
agents are composed of combinations of the following components: Perception, integration of per-
ception and action, control of action, planning and learning. In a similar fashion, Russel & Norvig
(2010) main unifying theme is the idea of an intelligent agent. They define AI as the study of agents
that receive percepts from the environment and perform actions. Each such agent implements a
function that maps percept sequences to actions. They explain the role of learning as extending
the reach of the designer into unknown environments, They also treat robotics (action) and vision
(perception) not as independently defined problems, but as occurring in the service of achieving
goals. Also they stress the importance of the task environment in determining the appropriate
agent design.
In this view, an agent is anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through
sensors and acting upon that environment through actuators. Russel & Norvig (2010) use the term
percept to refer to the agents perceptual inputs at any given instant. An agent’s percept sequence
is the complete history of everything the agent has ever perceived. In general, an agent’s choice of
action at any given instant can depend on the entire percept sequence observed to date, but not on
anything it has not perceived. By specifying the agent’s choice of action for every possible percept
sequence, we have said more or less everything there is to say about the agent. Mathematically
speaking, we say that an agent’s behavior is described by the agent function that maps any given
percept sequence to an action. Internally, the agent function for an artificial agent will be imple-
mented by an agent program. It is important to keep these two ideas distinct. The agent function
is an abstract mathematical description; the agent program is a concrete implementation, running
within some physical system.
They answer this age-old question in an age-old way: by considering the consequences of the
agent’s behavior. When an agent is plunked down in an environment, it generates a sequence of
actions according to the percepts it receives. This sequence of actions causes the environment to
go through a sequence of states. If the sequence is desirable, then the agent has performed well.
This notion of desirability is captured by a performance measure that evaluates any given sequence
of environment states. As a general rule, it is better to design performance measures according to
what one actually wants in the environment (cf. goal states), rather than according to how one
thinks the agent should behave (Russel & Norvig, 2010). To the extent that an agent relies on
the prior knowledge of its designer rather than on its own percepts, we say that the agent lacks
autonomy. A rational agent should be autonomous: it should learn what it can to compensate for
partial or incorrect prior knowledge. Russel & Norvig (2010) group all these under the heading of
the task environment. They call this the PEAS (Performance, Environment, Actuators, Sensors)
description. In designing an agent, the first step must always be to specify the task environment
as fully as possible. Section 5.1 in paper II of this series will provide descriptions of some of the
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environments and their dynamics.
1.3.1 Agent formalization and dynamics
Arbib (1987) already argued that to understand complex behavior it will not be satisfactory to
use the classical description of finite automata that specifies the next state for every state-input
pair. Rather, we must see how various small automata are built up one upon the other in a
hierarchical fashion. We now formally define an adaptive autonomous agent as a hierarchical
network of port automatas (Corbacho, 1997). We have tried to stay away from the ”global” state-
space representation employed to formalize autonomous agents (Rivest and Shapire, 1989; Shen,
1994) to a more ”diversity-based” modular representation closer to the structural development
and composition of biological systems. Thus, an adaptive autonomous agent (A) is an automata
network (Lyons & Arbib, 1989; Steenstrup, Arbib & Manes, 1983; Weisbuch, 1991) composed of
a set of automata interconnected such that the outputs of some are the inputs to others. We
will show that the hierarchical network of automata is a hierarchical network of different types of
schemas (Arbib, 1995; Corbacho & Arbib, 1996). That is, A inner’s dynamics is also defined by
multi-agent-based modelling, that is a network of simple interacting components gives rise to the
emergence of different (complex) behaviors by competitive and cooperative distributed dynamics.
To illustrate the main components we will use a particular formal implementation based on
schema theory. Schema theory can be implemented by neural networks or can be implemented by
any other language when applied to software agents or mechanical devices. Schema-based learning
(SBL) is an extension to schema theory dealing with the autonomous construction of new schemas
as they are needed to solve encountered problems. SBL is an architecture to construct a myriad
of internal models of several types: predictive schemas, dual (inverse models) schemas and goal
schemas on the run.
Definition. An Adaptive Autonomous Agent (A) is defined at a particular point in time
t by the tuple:
A(t) = (D,S(t), C(t), Q(t), R(t), L) (1)
where D defines the different internal drives, D = {di, ...}; di = {αi, dmaxi , a(i), I(i)}, where I(i)
correspond to incentives and a(i) correspond to drive reduction in the presence of some substrate.
S(t) = {S1, ..., SN} determines the set of shemas S1, ..., SN at time t; C(t) determines the port-to-
port connection map; Q(t) determines the schema support network; R(t) determines the cause-effect
relations between different schemas, typically initially empty since they are learned by observing
the effects of the interactions after they have been experimented by the agent, and L corresponds
to the constructive algorithm in charge of constructing new schemas in the set S as well as their
new relations in C,Q,R.
A particular Agent is related to a particular type of environment. The environment E directly
interacts with the autonomous agent A through the agent’s receptors which receive signals from E
and the agents effectors which, in turn, affect E (Figure 1). Both dynamics are captured by the
primitive perceptual and primitive motor schemas respectively (both in the set S(t)).
- Primitive perceptual schemas: the input port of schema Sk : (inputki = f(E(oj)))
- Primitive motor schemas schemas: the output port of schema Sm : (E(il) = g(output
m
i ))
Thus, there is a clear analogy with respect to the PEAS framework of Russel & Norvig (2010)
described in section 1.3. In this regard, the primitive perceptual schemas are in direct connection
to the agent’s sensors (S in PEAS). The primitive action schemas are in direct connection to the
actuators (A in PEAS). The environment function E is modeled in SCAI by yet another set of
port automata. Finally, the performance function (P) is formalized in SCAI by drive reduction,
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value maximization, performance and coherence maximization. SCAI will incrementally extend and
adapt S(t), C(t), Q(t), and R(t) accordingly in order to maximize coherence with its environment.
Figure 1: The agent immersed in the environment E. The agent receives input from
the environment through the receptors in primitive perceptual schemas (e.g. Sk) and affects
the environment through the effectors in primitive motor schemas (e.g. Sm). All sorts of
internal interactions take place defining in some sense another ”internal environment”. The
different internal drives affect the inner dynamics (e. g. by setting goals to be achieved). This
diagram only illustrates one example for each of the different possible internal interactions
We will later show how the network of interacting schema instances will take the AAA from a
situation (context), and goals (desirable states triggered by drives) to a feasible course of action
that meets the goals. The set of schemas changes through time, thus, the Connectivity map has to
change appropriately. Now let us proceed to formalize schemas within the schema-based learning
constructive architecture.
2 Self-constructive Principles of Organization
We propose that SCAI is based on three principles of organization: self-growing, self-experimental
and self-repairing; and these principles apply to all aspects of intelligence: perception, integration
of perception and action, control of action, and planning. Learning already being an integral part
of the previous components. We also suggest that AGI must also, at least, follow these same three
principles of organization.
Self-growing: the ability to autonomously and incrementally construct structures and function-
ality as needed to solve encountered (sub)problems. Self-experimental: the ability to internally
simulate, anticipate and take decisions based on these expectations. Self-repairing: the ability to
autonomously re-construct a previously successful functionality or pattern of interaction.
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Self-experimental: an active machine capable of performing experiments of its own interactions
with the environment as well as capable of internally simulating the results of those interactions
in order to be able to later decide the most optimal course of action. In order to understand its
relation with the environment, the agent constructs internal models of reality that allow the agent
to internally simulate its interactions with the environment. Hence, the agent has the capacity to
design experiments to be performed by interacting with the environment as well as experiments
inside the mind, for instance by mental practice/modeling, visualization and simulation. In this
regard, cause-effect experimentation (section 4.1) triggers the construction of predictive schemas
and its dual schemas. Hence, a very important component of the self-experimental agent consists on
the ability to simulate the causal flow of the interactions with the environment. In this regard, pre-
dictive schemas allow for internal modeling. That is, they allow the system to anticipate the results
of an action before it is taken. That is, predictive schemas produce anticipatory representations of
events/effects that have no yet occurred in the external environment.
The self-constructive agent is self-growing. In this regard we show an example of schema con-
struction growing a new topological configuration to represent, and hence be able to reproduce, a
successful relevant pattern of interaction. We show how the agent builds itself up using the SBL
formalization of schema construction. This relates to structural learning (Kemp & Tenembaum,
2008; Sanchez-Montanes & Corbacho, 2019; Salakhutdinov, Tenenbaum, & Torralba, 2013; Ten-
embaum, Kemp, Griffiths & Goodman, 2011) and modular learning (Jacobs, Jordan, Nowlan &
Hinton, 1991; Jordan & Jacobs, 1992) since SCAI autonomously constructs new modular struc-
tures that allow increasing functionality while encapsulating existing functionality, and avoiding
destructive interference across different functional tasks.
We finish up by showing that the self-constructive agent is self-repairing. Thar is, the agent
has the capacity to repair itself and re-construct past functionality after certain functionality may
have been damaged. In order to so, we show how the constructive principles developed are able
to explain learning after damage of the control circuitry that initially prevents grip closing during
reach and grasp motor functionality (critical for many robots).
2.1 Self-constructive Artificial Intelligence is self-experimental
Intelligent agents are self-experimental since to ensure ”survival” the self-constructive agent is an
active machine capable of performing experiments of its own interactions with the environment as
well as capable of mentally simulating the results of those interactions in order to be able to later
decide the most optimal course of action. As previously described, different schema molecules are
activated in parallel to select the proper course of action. The right dual schema is selected whose
predictive schema simulates and anticipates the desired goal state.
In this regard, the way for our mind to fully understand anything is to model and simulate it.
As Pezzulo (2008) has expressed, cognition is for doing, for simulating. In order to understand its
relation with the environment the mind constructs internal models of reality that allow the mind
to internally simulate its interactions with the environment. Hence, the intelligent agent has the
capacity to design experiments to be performed by interacting with the environment as well as
experiments inside the mind, for instance by mental practice, visualization and simulation. There
is a growing body of experimental data that supports the idea of the self-experimental brain. In this
regard, experimental evidence indicates that animals can use mental simulation to make decisions
about the action to take during goal-directed navigation (Chersi, Donnarumma, & Pezzulo, 2013).
Its most salient characteristic is that choices about actions are made by simulating movements and
their sensory effects using the same brain areas that are active during overt execution. Chersi et al.
(2013) link these results with a general framework that sees the mind as a predictive device that
9
can detach itself from the here-and-now of current perception using mechanisms such as episodic
memories, motor and visual imagery. In this regard, the concept of action simulation is gaining
momentum in cognitive science, neuroscience, and robotics, and in particular within the study
of grounded, embodied and motor cognition (Declerck, 2013; Hesslow, 2012; Raos, Evangeliou &
Saraki, 2007; Jeannerod, 2001; Mohan, Sandini & Morasso, 2014; Pezzulo, Candini, Dindo, &
Barca, 2013).
The ability to construct a hypothetical situation in one’s imagination prior to it actually oc-
curring may afford greater accuracy in predicting its eventual outcome. The recollection of past
experiences is also considered to be a re-constructive process with memories recreated from their
component parts (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Construction, therefore, plays a critical role in al-
lowing us to plan for the future and remember the past. Conceptually, construction can be broken
down into a number of constituent processes although little is known about their neural correlates.
Moreover, it has been suggested that some of these processes may be shared by a number of other
cognitive functions including spatial navigation and imagination.
In this regard, mental practice is the cognitive rehearsal of a physical skill in the absence of
overt physical movement (Jordan, 1983). The questions arises whether mental practice enhances
performance (Driskell, Copper & Moran, 1994; Gentili, Han, Schweighofer & Papaxanthis, 2010;
Miall & Wolpert, 1996). Mental practice promotes motor anticipation as for example there is
evidence from skilled music performance. On the other hand, mental imagery can be described as
the maintenance and manipulation of perception and actions of a covert sort, i. e., it arises not
as a consequence of environmental interaction but is created internally by the mind (Di Nuovo,
Marocco, Di Nuovo & Cangelosi; 2013; Kossyln, Gani & Thompson, 2001; Lallee & Dominey, 2013;
Svensson, Thill & Ziemke, 2013). According to the simulation hypothesis, mental imagery can be
explained in terms of predictive chains of simulated perceptions and actions, i.e., perceptions and
actions are reactivated internally by our nervous system to be used in mental imagery and other
cognitive phenomena (Chersi, Donnarumman & Pezzulo, 2013; Hesslow, 2002, 2012; Svensson,
Thill & Ziemke, 2013). In this regard, Svensson, Thill & Ziemke (2013) go a step further and
hypothesize that dreams informing the construction of simulations lead to faster development of
good simulations during waking behavior.
Certain type of generative models such as the wake-sleep type algorithms (Hinton, Dayan, Frey
& Neal, 1995) are composed of forward connections as well as backward connections which can give
rise to mental visualizations (Friston, 2010). That is, during the sleep generative phase, phantasy
patterns corresponding to visualizations can be generated thanks to the information flow generated
by the backward projection. In the same way, we show that predictive schemas are capable of
producing anticipatory activity patterns as the result of mental modeling. In this regard, we will
later show anticipatory (phantasy) activity pattern in the motor heading map ( ˆmhm(t+1)) during
learning to detour (cf. dynamic remapping: Droulesz & Berthoz, 1991; Duhamel et al., 1992) Also
later we will display internally simulated activity patterns in proprioceptive grip receptor schemas
( ˆgrip rec(t + 1)) during learning after a system failure has taken place. The prediction of states
of the body has also been shown to be a useful capability in resilient robots (Bongard, Zykov, &
Lipson, 2006) and it has been suggested that this could be generalized to internal models of the
environment (Adami, 2006).
We have already introduced internal models in section 3.1 and their SBL implementation, pre-
dictive and dual schemas in section 3.2. Predictive schemas allow for mental modeling. That is,
they allow the system to anticipate the results of an action before it is taken. That is, predic-
tive schemas produce anticipatory representations of events/effects that have no yet occurred in
the outside environment. That is, the self-experimental brain produces anticipatory experimental
patterns of activity. Yet the question remains as to how the predictive schemas are constructed.
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In this regard, cause-effect experimentation triggers the construction of predictive schemas and its
corresponding dual schemas. Hence, a very important component of the self-experimental brain
consists on the ability to simulate the causal flow of the interactions with the environment and,
thus, learn cause-effect relations from the potentially combinatorially large set of hypothesis. In
learning new causal relations by experimentation, the potentially combinatorial explosion is con-
strained by interacting with the environment. In an analogous manner as constraint relaxation
dynamics reduce an exponential space into a more tractable space of possible configurations, sec-
tion 4.1 will introduce the mechanisms to learn the effective cause-effect relations within a complex
system (e.g. brain, autonomous agent).
3 Self-constructive Architecture
Schema theory and its extension with Schema-based learning (SBL from now on) may serve as a
possible framework to formalize SCAI. Historically the notion of ”internal models of the world”
led to the notion of schema (Arbib, 1972; Barlett, 1932; Neisser, 1976, Piaget, 1971). We first
introduce and formalize the notion of schema to describe the modular functional and structural
characterization of the agent’s mind. Schemas also serve to encapsulate specific patterns of inter-
action (cf. Hinton et al., 2011; Sabour et al., 2017) Then, we introduce the notion of predictive
schema to generalize and formalize the concept of internal forward models within the SBL archi-
tecture (Corbacho and Arbib 1997c; Corbacho, 1998). The work presented here emphasizes the use
and construction of new predictive internal models (predictive schemas) as well as the construction
of their corresponding dual schemas when specific conditions arise during the interaction of the
agent with its environment. SBL also presents a more general approach including a wider variety
of schemas, and a larger repertoire of processes to construct the different kinds of schemas under
various conditions.
Corbacho and Arbib (1997a) introduced the notion of coherence to emphasize the importance
of maximizing the congruence between the results of an interaction (external or internal) and the
expectations (previously learned) for that interaction. The fundamental two principles of organiza-
tion in SBL are coherence and performance maximization. Besides the main units of organization,
the predictive schema and its dual associated schema, goal schemas are the other component in
charge of dynamically setting a hierarchy of goals. SBL attempts to reduce incoherences and get
closer to goal states simultaneously. One of the main operations in SBL is the construction of all
these internal models.
We will briefly review the notion of schema introduced in Corbacho (1997). We described a
schema as a unit of concurrent processing corresponding to a domain of interaction. Lyons & Arbib
(1989) provided a formal semantics based on port automata and Corbacho (1997) extended this
definition to include schema activity variables and their dynamics. Other schema formalizations
related to development and learning have been proposed (e.g. Drescher, 1991; Pezzulo, et al., 2013)).
Definition: A basic schema description is
basic-schema::= [Schema-Name: <N>
Input-Port-List: (<Iplist>)
Output-Port-List: (<Oplist>)
Variable-List: (<Varlist>)
Behavior: (<Behavior>)]
where N is an identifying name for the schema SN ,
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< Iplist > and < Oplist > are lists of (Portname : Porttype) pairs for input and output ports,
respectively.
< V arlist > is a list of (V arname : V artype) pairs for all internal variable names, and
< Behavior > is a specification of computing behavior.
The notation ixk(t) is used to represent the pattern of activity in the kth input port of schema
Sx at time t and oxk(t) for the analogous output port. In the rest of the paper, in order to alleviate
the use of notation, when the schema has a single output port, then this output port takes the
name of the schema in lower case. That is, for instance we will use the notation target(t) to name
the output port activity pattern from the STARGET target recognition visual schema.
As mentioned before rather than simply process input symbols to yield output symbols, the
individual schemas have activation levels which measure some degree of confidence, and it is, for
instance, the more active of a set of perceptual schemas that will trigger the appropriate motor
schema(s) to yield the appropriate response. This is a very simple example of the type of mecha-
nisms of competition and cooperation (Arbib, 1995) that can be exhibited by a network of schemas.
In particular multiple motor schemas may be coactivated to control subtle behaviors. Thus, we
have extended the definition of schema to allow for activation variables. We will also introduce
an activation rule defining the dynamics of the activation variable. Other schemas may affect the
state of the activation variable (sending support through their respective control output ports),
thus, the need for both input and output control ports. These ports are called control ports since
they determine the state of the activation variable which in turn determines whether to ”activate”
the (standard) output ports. In summary theActivation Rule updates the activation variable based
on support from other schemas. Also each schema has an associated threshold θx ∈ < to determine
when the schema is activated. Consider the schema Sx:
AcVarlist is a list of pairs containing (axm : <), (qx,y : <), (θx : <).
CIolist is a lists of (Portname : <) pairs for input control ports.
COolist is a pair (Portname : <) for output control ports.
AcRule is a specification of computing behavior
axm(t+ 1) = σ(
∑
y
qx,y(t) · aym(t)) (2)
where qx,y ∈ < ”weights” the support from schema Sy to schemaSx.
These new components may be introduced as farther ”slots” in the RS basic schema structure
or they can be incorporated within the already existing ”slots”. The second choice might already
provide hints as to the semantic mapping from this extended schema to the Port Automaton (PA).
Namely, the activation variable can be considered an internal variable of the schema in the RS
terminology. The control ports may be added to the list of ports, and the Activation Rule becomes
extra statements in the Behavioral specification.
Schema assertion is defined in RS by default, that is, when a schema was instantiated in RS it
was immediately asserted. Hence, here we introduce another state which corresponds to the case
when a schema that is instantiated is deasserted (not asserted).
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Definition. Schema Deassertion. The activation rule decides when to deactivate output ports. An
SI of the schema Sx, Sxv (i1, i2, ...)(o1, o2, ....), is deasserted iff a
x
n ≤ 0, then for all i, oi = ]. Following
Lyons and Arbib’s (1989) convention, a value of ] indicates that there is no input or output at the
designated port. As a corollary we can see that when a schema is not asserted it can not support
other schemas since its output control port will also be deactivated.
As we have already mentioned, Corbacho & Arbib (1997c) also introduced two special kinds of
schemas, namely predictive schemas and goal schemas. Goal schemas are a special kind of schemas
whose output port corresponds to a goal state (i.e. desired pattern of activation in another schema).
On the other hand, the role of the predictive schema is to anticipate the effect that the particular
pattern of activation of the cause schema has on the current state of the effect schema.
3.1 Internal models for predictive adaptive control
The importance of internal models in intelligent behavior has been acknowledged for many years
(e.g. Craik 1943; Gregory, 1967; Arbib 1972). Internal models predict the evolution of the envi-
ronment by imitating its causal flaw. They play an important role in directing intelligent behavior
under a fundamental hypothesis that the mind constructs reality as much as it embodies it. At
the behavioral level we see that animals learn to anticipate predictable events. The term internal
model is also popular in control theory and denotes a set of equations that describes the temporal
development of a real world process (e.g. Kalman 1960; Garcia et al. 1989).
The concept of an internal model, a system which mimics the behaviour of a natural process,
has also emerged as an important theoretical concept in motor control (Haruno, Wolpert & Kawato,
2001; Jordan, 1983; Kawato, 1990, 1999; Kawato, Furukawa & Suzuki, 1987; Miall & Wolpert, 1996;
Wolpert, Ghahramani & Jordan, 1995; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998). Internal models can be classified
into several conceptually distinct classes. One type of internal model is a causal representation
of the motor apparatus, sometimes known as forward model (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992). Such
a model would aim to mimic or represent the normal behavior of the motor system in response
to outgoing motor commands. A forward model is a key ingredient in a system that uses motor
outflow (also called efference copy) to anticipate and cancel the sensory effects of movement. The
internal sensory signal needed to cancel reafference has been labeled corollary discharge.
Potential uses of forward models include: canceling sensory reafference, distal supervised learn-
ing, internal feedback to overcome time delays, state estimation, and state prediction for model
predictive control and mental practice/planning (Miall & Wolpert, 1996). More specifically, predic-
tive internal models may allow to transform errors between the desired and actual sensory outcome
for a movement into the corresponding error in motor command, to resolve ambiguous information,
to synthesize information from disparate sources, to combine efferent and afferent information, to
perform mental practice (internal simulation) to learn to select between possible actions, to per-
form state estimation in order to anticipate and cancel sensory effects of ones own actions (not
to distract attention/resources), to reduce the credit assignment space, to contribute to reasoning
and planning by forming predictive chains, and finally to estimate the outcome of an action and
use it before sensory feedback is available, when delays make feedback control too slow for rapid
movements (Miall & Wolpert, 1996).
One fundamental problem which the system faces in the context of motor control is that the goal
and outcome of a movement are often defined in task-related coordinates (Jordan & Rumelhart,
1992). A basic problem, therefore, exists in translating these task-related (visual or auditory) goals
and errors into the appropriate intrinsic signals (motor commands and motor errors) which are
required to update the controller. The forward model can be used to estimate the motor errors
13
during performance by backpropagation of sensory errors through the model. In this paper we will
show how this problem of distal supervised learning generalizes beyond motor control and applies
to many schemas all over the agent architecture.
Another kind of internal models are known as inverse models (Atkeson, 1989), which invert the
causal flow of the motor system. They generate, from inputs about its state and state transitions,
an output representing the causal events that produced that state (Cruse & Steinkuelher, 1993;
Wada & Kawato, 1993; Shadmehr & Mussa-Ivaldi, 1994). For example, an inverse dynamics model
of the arm would estimate the motor command that caused a particular movement. The input
might therefore be the current and the desired state of the arm; the output would be the motor
command which would cause the arm to shift from the current state to the desired state. An inverse
sensory output model would predict the changes in state that corresponded to a change in sensory
inflow. In the kinematic domain the inverse kinematic model again inverts the forward kinematic
model to produce a set of joint angles which achieve a particular hand position. However, as a
forward model may have a many-to-one mapping, there is no guarantee that a unique inverse will
exist.
As already mentioned, historically, the notion of ”internal models of the world” led to the
notion of schema (Arbib, 1972). Hence, we will use schema theory and particularly its extension
schema-based learning (Corbacho & Arbib, 1997c) as the framework to formalize SCAI.
3.2 Predictive and Dual schemas
Corbacho (1997) presented predictive schemas as a generalization of forward models (Jordan &
Rumelhart, 1992) since they not only apply to motor control but rather to perceptual, sensorimo-
tor and abstract representational spaces as well. As already described, the role of the predictive
schema is to anticipate the effect that the particular pattern of activation of the cause schema has
on the current state of the effect schema. Also every predictive schema has an associated dual
schema that is responsible for selecting the optimal pattern of activity in the cause schema such
that a goal pattern of activity in the effect schema can be achieved.
Definition: A predictive schema P x,y associated with effect schema Sx and dual schema Sy,x
(cause schema Sy) is a schema with the following special characteristics:
< Iplist >: The first input port is of the same type and connects to the output port of the
effect schema Sx, i.e. ix,y1 (t) = o
x(t). The second input port is of the same type and connects to
the output port of the dual schema Sy,x, (cause schema Sy), i.e. ix,y2 (t) = o
y,x(t) (ix,y2 (t) = o
y(t)).
The remaining input ports are optional and correspond to context information; i. e. ix,y3 (t) = o
v(t)
< Oplist >: The output port contains the predictive response oˆx,y(t + 1), representing the
expectation for the state of the output port of the effect schema Sx at time t + 1, given the
information in the input ports, that is, oˆx,y(t+ 1) = E[ox(t+ 1)|ox(t), oy,x(t), ov(t)].
< V arlist >: Includes the parameters of the predictive schema, namely Wx,yP (t).
< Behavior >: The predictive schema behavioral specification includes a mapping Mx,yP pa-
rameterized by Wx,yP (t), such that
oˆx,y(t+ 1) = Mx,yP (o
x(t), oy,x(t), ov(t); Wx,yP (t)) (3)
as well as a mapping TP that allows the predictive schema to be tuned, i.e. its parameters change
according to the prediction error (ox(t+ 1)− oˆx,y(t + 1)), so that the predictive response oˆx,y(t +
1) becomes increasingly closer to the observed response ox(t + 1) as the number of interactions
increases. In this regard, several error minimization methods are valid. Also, depending on the
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architectural implementation of the schema, Wx,yP takes the corresponding form. In this article we
use the mean squared error as the cost functional for schema adaptation as suggested by Jordan &
Rumelhart (1992). Hence, the functional becomes
Wx,yP (t+ 1) = TP (W
x,y
P (t), oˆ
x,y(t+ 1), ox(t+ 1),
∂oˆx,y
∂Wx,yP
) (4)
Corbacho et al. (2005b) followed a particular neural network implementation of both map-
pings Mx,yP (t) and TP (t) by a learning spatio-temporal mapping algorithm. Sanchez-Montanes and
Corbacho (2004) presented an information theoretic metric to build this type of mappings.
Associated to the predictive schema P x,y there is always its corresponding dual schema Sy,x.
The predictive schema is the analogous to the forward internal models and the dual schema is the
analogous to the inverse internal model (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992).
Definition: A dual schema Sy,x associated with predictive schema P y,x, produces the neces-
sary optimal pattern of activity input to the cause schema Sy in order to successively achieve the
desired goal pattern of activity in the effect schema Sx. It is a schema with the following special
characteristics:
< Iplist >: The first input port is of the same type and connects to the output port of the
effect schema Sx, i.e. iy,x1 (t) = o
x(t). The second input port is of the same type and connects to
the output port of the goal schema Gz,x, i.e. ix,y2 (t) = o
∗z,x(t + 1), that is, a goal schema that is
in charge of producing a goal pattern of activity for the effect schema Sx (defined below). The
remaining input ports are optional and correspond to context information; i. e. iy,x3 (t) = o
v(t)
< Oplist >: The output port is of the same type and connects to the input port of cause
schema Sy
< V arlist >: Includes the parameters of the dual schema, namely Wy,x.
< Behavior >: The dual schema behavioral specification includes a mapping My,x parameter-
ized by Wy,x(t), such that
øy,x(t) = My,x(ox(t), o∗z,x(t+ 1), ov(t); Wy,x(t)) (5)
as well as a mapping T ,
Wy,x(t+ 1) = T (Wy,x(t), ox(t+ 1), o∗z,x(t+ 1),
∂oˆx,y
∂oy,x
,
∂oy,x
∂Wy,x
) (6)
T allows the dual schema to be tuned, i.e. its parameters change according to the performance
error (o∗z,x(t+ 1)− ox(t+ 1)), so that the observed response ox(t+ 1) becomes increasingly closer
to the desired goal response o∗z,x(t + 1) as the number of interactions increases. The problem
of training the dual schema is a distal learning problem (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992) since the
parameters of the dual schema must be adapted based on the error on a distal space. That is,
the dual schema must find parameters that recover the optimal patterns in the space of the cause
schema, that is in the representation space of oy(t) so as to reduce the difference in the distal error
space (o∗z,x(t + 1) − ox(t + 1)). As Jordan and Rumelhart (1992) described, and online learning
algorithm based on stochastic gradient descend can be used.
To perform adaptation, the change of weights must take into account ∂o
x,y
∂oy,x . Yet, the dependence
of ox,y on oy,x is assumed to be unknown a priori. Yet, given a differentiable predictive forward
model, it can be approximated by ∂oˆ
x,y
∂oy,x . That is, the distal error is propagated backward though
the predictive schema (forward model) and down into the dual schema (inverse model) where
15
the weights are actually changed accordingly. For the sake of clarity and simplification for this
article, we assume that only one predictive and its corresponding dual schema are instantiated
for each specific active motor schema. Hence, avoiding issues of integration (linear on nonlinear).
Thus, oˆx(t) = oˆx,y(t), oy(t) = oy,x(t) and ∂oˆ
x
∂oy =
∂oˆx,y
∂oy,x . In this regard, equation 19 will also be
simplified to reflect this assumption. Kawato’s (1990a) feedback-error-learning can also be used
in this context. Later, we will schematize this information flow once a shema-based model is
introduced and described.
3.3 Goal schemas and goal-oriented behavior
Goal oriented behavior is one of the hallmarks of intelligent systems. That is, the ability to set and
achieve a wide range of goals (desirable states defining an objective signal). Goal states must be
stored so that they can be actively sought for in the future. We must distinguish between implicit
(hardwired) goals and learned goals and subgoals. Drive reduction pertains to the first kind.
Where drives can be viewed as states (Milner, 1977), which influence neurons either mechanically
or chemically, and which have representations. Based on this hypothesis, Arbib & Lieblich (1977)
introduced a set (di, ...) of discrete drives to control the agent behavior. At each time t, each drive
di has a value di(t). Drives can be appetitive or aversive. Each appetitive drive spontaneously
increases with time towards dmax, while aversive drives are reduced towards 0, both according to
a factor αd. An additional increase occurs if an incentive I(d, x, t) is present such as the sight
or aroma of food (e.g. SPREY schema active) in the case of hunger. Drive reduction a(d, x, t)
takes place in the presence of some substrate -food reduces the hunger drive. If the agent is in the
situation x at time t, then the value of d at time t+ 1 will become
d(t+ 1) = d(t) + αd|dmax − d(t)| − a(d, x, t)|d(t)|+ I(d, x, t)|dmax − d(t)| (7)
Internal drives (variables) must be kept within a restricted interval to assure the survivability of the
agent (intrinsic hardwired goals). A particular state x(t) becomes a goal state x(t)∗ if it is directlly
associated to drive reduction a(d, x, t) or is predictive of drive reduction. From this a hierarchy of
subgoals has to be learned. That is, what states take the system to the primary goals (Guazzelli,
Corbacho, Bota & Arbib, 1998). Corbacho (1997) included hunger, fear, thirst, etc; in this paper
we have included just hunger. A goal corresponds to a state with a high drive reduction or in the
way (anticipating drive reduction). x in the definition above is the state of the output port of a
schema (or schemas) at time t. Corbacho (1997) described reinforcement type algorithms to store
primary sensory goal states, that is, sensory states associated with high reward or anticipation of
reward. These are specially needed in stochastic environments with delayed reinforcement (Sutton,
1988; 1990; Sutton & Barto, 1998), more details in Corbacho (1997).
Hence, the ability to set and generate goals and subgoals is critical, such as the goal state of
the jaw muscle spindles indicating that the mouth must be open in order to get the prey. So the
constructive brain architecture must be able to restore desired states so that they can be actively
pursued. The desired state in a particular schema is triggered by the contextual state defined by
the activity pattern in another schema. For secondary goals, goal states must be parametrized by
contextual information. That is, the goal pattern of activity must be produced by an adaptive
mapping. So, for instance, prey-catching reduces the hunger drive, which is signaled by the prey in
the mouth, so that when a prey is within the visual field a subgoal must be generated so that the
jaw muscle spindles must get activated, indicating that the mouth is successefully open in order
to allow the prey to get into the mouth. During leaning, the reinforcement signals enhance the
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elegibility of the projections from the prey recognition schema to the jaw spindles goal pattern of
activity representation (Corbacho, 1997). Another example in adaptive navigation corresponds to
the goal schema that produces a goal pattern of representation in the motor heading map in the
presence of a target, namely representing that in order to capture the target it must be centered
within its sensorimotor representation, that is the target is ”within grasp”. Sections 6.2.1 and 7.3.1
will detail these goal schemas learned during learning to detour and learning to grip in respectively.
Definition: A goal schema Gz,x associated to (source) schema Sz and (objective) schema Sx
(typically an effect schema in a dual/predictive schema) is a schema with the following special
characteristics:
< Iplist >: The first input port is of the same type and connects to the output port of the
source schema Sz, i.e. iz,x1 (t) = o
z(t). The remaining input ports are optional and correspond to
contextual information.
< Oplist >: The output port contains the objective response o∗z,x(t + 1), representing the
desired pattern of activation in ox(t+ 1).
< V arlist >: Includes parameters of the goal schema, Wz,xG . It also includes the matrix V for
value maximization by reinforcement learning type dynamics that selects goal patterns of activity
as well as internal variables G to store temporal delayed states:
< Behavior >: Implements a mapping M z,xG from different inputs at different times to the
objective response,
o∗z,x(t+ 1) = M z,xG (o
z(t), G(t); Wz,xG (t)) (8)
where
G(t− 1) := o∗z,x(t), ..., G(t− n) := G(t− n− 1) (9)
and := corresponds to the assignment operator.
It also includes a mapping TG,
Wz,xG (t+ 1) = TG(W
z,x
G (t), o
∗z,x(t+ 1), ox(t+ 1)) (10)
that attempts to reduce the difference between o∗z,x(t+ 1) and ox(t+ 1)), adapted by the training
set selected by value maximization selecting only paterns (o∗z,xα (ti), oxα(ti)) that maximize expected
value, that is, selected in case at time ti:
V (o∗z,xα (ti)), ti) > β (11)
where
V (x, t) = e(t) + 
∑
i,j
cx,y · V (y, t+ 1) (12)
e(t) corresponds to direct reinforcement associated to drive reduction, that is e(t) = a(d, x, t), for
instance target in grip(t) receives inmediate reward associated to the hunger drive reduction, cx,y
corresponds to the matrix of goal states dependencies learned by cause-effect type dynamics (sec-
tion 4.1) and  < 1. For instance, only certain subset of grip(t) patterns achieve a high enough
value. The value is received since it is time correlated with other states of high value. These high
value grip patterns are the only ones that are learned in relation to the target pattern. This is
a type of reinforcement learning (Sutton, 1988; 1990; Sutton & Barto, 1981; 1998) and has been
shown to explain anticipatory neural activity (Suri & Schultz, 2001).
A specific spatio-temporal mapping learning algorithm to learn this mapping is presented in (Cor-
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bacho et al., 2005b) and a generalized information-theoretic measure is presented in (Sanchez-
Montanes & Corbacho, 2004).
4 Self-constructive pseudo-Algorithm and Dynamics
As previously described in section 1.3.1 the initial agent functionality/structure (at time t0) is
predefined by the seed schema(s) structure determined by the tuple:
A(t0) = (D,S(t0) = {S1, ..., SN}, C(t0), Q(t0), R(t0), L) (13)
S(t0) = {S1, ..., SN} determines the set of initial (pre-wired) seed shemas S1, ..., SN ; C(t0) deter-
mines the initial port-to-port connection map; Q(t0) determines the initial schema support network;
R(t0) determines the cause-effect relations between different schemas, typically initially empty since
they are learned by observing the effects of the interactions after they have been experimented by
the agent. L will incrementally extend and adapt S(t), C(t), Q(t), and R(t) accordingly in order
to maximize A coherence with its environment. This section provides a schematic description of
the pseudo-algorithm by describing the different algorithmic components, namely:
A) Schema dynamics:
B) Value, Performance and Coherence maximization for Schema Adaptation
C) Schema Construction conditions
D) Schema Construction
This different algorithmic components are activated following a cooperative and competitive dis-
tibuted model of computation (Arbib,1976). Hence, giving rise to a dynamic configuration of these
components This section provides a schematic description of the pseudo-algorithm. Later sections
describe in more detail some important aspects of the algorithm. Section 4.1 describes in more
detail the Cause-Effect dynamics and section 4.2 provides a more detailed description of the Schema
Construction process central to the SCAI algorithm.
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A) Schema dynamics
:::::::: a) Drive dynamics and primitive goal generation :::::::
∀di ∈ D: di(t+ 1) = di(t) + αi|dmaxi − di(t)| − a(i, t)|di(t)|+ I(i, t)|dmaxi − di(t)|
:::::::: b) Primitive perceptual schema assertion :::::::
∀i, j s.t. E(oj)(t) 6= ]: inputi(t) = M i(E(oj)) & ai(t) = Θi + δ
:::::::: c) Schema support propagation: :::::::
∀i: ai(t+ 1) = σ(∑j qi,j(t) · aj(t))
(for details on the different constraints on qi,j refer to Corbacho & Arbib (2019)
:::::::: d) Subset goal schema assertion: :::::::
∀az(t) such that az(t) > Θz, oz(t) 6= ]
ø∗z,x(t+ 1) = M z,xG (o
z(t), G(t); Wz,xG (t))
where G(t− 1) := o∗z,x(t), ..., G(t− n) := G(t− n− 1)
:::::::: e) Subset Dual and Predictive schema assertion :::::::
∀a∗z,x(t), av(t), such that a∗z,x(t) > Θ, av(t) > Θ, o∗z,x(t) 6= ]
oy,x(t) = My,x(ox(t), o∗z,x(t+ 1), ov(t); Wy,x(t))
and if ay,x(t) > Θ, oy,x(t) 6= ]
oˆx,y(t+ 1) = Mx,yP (o
x(t), oy,x(t), ov(t); Wx,yP (t))
:::::::: f) Primitive motor schema assertion :::::::
∀i, j s.t. outputi(t) 6= ] & ai(t) > Θi: E(ij)(t) = outputi(t)
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B) Value, Performance and Coherence Maximization for Schema Adaptation
:::::::: a) Adapt goal schemas: value maximization and training goal mappings:::::::
V (x, t) = e(t) + 
∑
i,j cx,y · V (y, t+ 1)
∀z, x if V (o∗z,xα (ti), ti) > β then
Wz,xG (ti + 1) = TG(W
z,x
G (ti), o
∗z,x
α (ti), o
x
α(ti))
:::::::: a’) Adapt dual & predictive schemas parameters by distal learning: :::::::
if (o∗z,x(t+ 1)− ox(t+ 1)) > 
Wy,x(t+ 1) = T (Wy,x(t), ox(t+ 1), o∗z,x(t+ 1), ∂oˆ
x,y
∂oy,x ,
∂oy,x
∂Wy,x )
if (ox(t+ 1)− oˆx,y(t+ 1)) > 
Wx,yP (t+ 1) = TP (W
x,y
P (t), oˆ
x,y(t+ 1), ox(t+ 1), ∂oˆ
x,y
∂Wx,yP
, )
C) Performance and Coherence Maximization conditions for Schema Construction
:::::::: Unexpected event, Goal and Context relations :::::::
Unexpected incoherence conditions:
a) ∃x, y such that ox(t+ 1) = ] & oˆx,y(t+ 1) 6= ], or
a’) ∃x, y such that ox(t+ 1) 6= ] & oˆx,y(t+ 1) = ]
b) Approaching goal:
∃x, y such that d(o∗z,x(t+ 1), ox(t+ 1)) ≤ d(o∗z,x(t+ 1), ox(t))
b’) Away from goal:
∃x, y such that d(o∗z,x(t+ 1), ox(t+ 1)) > d(o∗z,x(t+ 1), ox(t))
c) Unexpected new cause-effect relation:
∃x, y such that (Sx, Sy) where Rx,y > Θ and R dynamics are described in section 4.1
d) Define the context by the schema(s) Sv:
active before, during and after the unexpected event takes place at t:
ov[t− nδ, t+ nδ] 6= ]
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D) New schema construction and cause schema re-construction
Unexpected event (C.a or C.c) and approaching the goal (C.b) have selected the schemas triplet
indexed by [x, y, v] which serves to fill in the slots for the new to be constructed schemas.
a) Recruitment of overgeneralized schema dormant structures:
Predictive schema and Dual schema. Recruit from array of indexed functions:
SN+1(i1, . . . ik; o1, . . . , om);PN+1(i1, . . . ik; o1, . . . , om) (14)
:: Instantiation of the recruited overgeneralized schema structures ::
b) New predictive schema: PN+1 = P x,y,v
ix,y1 (t) = o
x(t)
ix,y2 (t) = o
y(t)
ix,y3 (t) = o
v(t)
oˆx,y(t) = E[oy(t+ 1)|ox(t), oy(t), ov(t)]
b’) New dual schema: SN+1 = Sy,x,v
iy,x1 (t) = o
x(t)
iy,x2 (t) = o
∗z,x(t+ 1)
iy,x3 (t) = o
v(t)
b”) New input port to re-construct cause schema Sy
′
:
iy
′
k+1(t) = o
y,x(t);
oy
′
(t) =
{
iy
′
k+1(t) if i
y′
k+1(t) 6= ]
oy(t) otherwise
The schema set changes to St+ 1) = S(t) ∪ {Sy,x,v, P x,y,v, Sy′} − Sy
In the next subsection the schema construction process will be described in more detail given
the relevance of this operator in the SCAI framework. Next, we will introduce the mechanisms to
learn the effective cause-effect relations within a complex system (e.g. brain, autonomous agent).
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4.1 Constructing Cause-Effect relations
In this section we propose learning mechanisms that will be able to construct the cause-effect
relations from the combinatorially large relational space. As already indicated, these cause-effect
relations will in turn allow for mental simulation and self-experimentation. To decide on a cause-
effect relation between two schemas Sx and Sy we will use some measure of delayed similarity of
the activity patterns out of their output ports during a time interval i.e. ox[ta, tb] and o
y[ta +
τ, tb + τ ] respectively. In general we will assume that any schema connects to any other schema
through several connections, we assume that these different connections will have different ”delay
properties”, thus giving rise to different responses in different connections. We now define the
instantaneous degree of cause-effect relation between two patterns ox(t) and oy(t), at a point in
time t by the following measure
cx,yτ (t) = Θ[o
x(t)] ·Θ[oy(t)]− αdx,yτ (t) (15)
where
dx,yτ (t) = (o
y(t− τ)− ox(t))2 (16)
Θ[x] =
{
1 if x 6= 0
0 otherwise
Two signals may not be very similar in their fine temporal structure yet they might be similar in
their qualitative behavior, that is, when one is active the other is also active, when one is large the
other is large, when one is growing the other is growing, and so on. If one of the signals is inactive
and the other is active the connection is decreased, so we implement a sort of AND operation, that
is, if both are active the first term in equation 12 becomes 1, hence increasing the weight in the
first case and decreasing the weight otherwise. At the end only those that maintain a recurrent
and constant delay relation remain. The threshold factors avoid correlations among layers that
are both inactive. Since when both are inactive the first term becomes 0 as both its factors are
0 and the second term is also 0. On the other hand, if one is active and the other is inactive the
”distance” of both signals becomes αdx,yτ (t). Finally if both are active their ”similarity” becomes
1− αdx,yτ (t).
The second phase consists of calculating how reliable the instantaneous cause-effect relation is
within a time interval [t0, tn]. This is calculated by
rx,yτ (t+ 1) = r
x,y
τ (t) + βc
x,y
τ (t) (17)
so that at the end of the training period the measure of the similarity of both signals will be
approximated by rx,yτ (tN ) = β
∑tn
t=t0
cx,yτ (t) When a correlation is not ”reliable” it will be positive
in certain occasions and negative in others, thus, overall the reliability measure will be close to 0.
From now on r denotes the matrix with components rx,yτ . The delays between actions and sensory
feedback are reflected on r. When a cause-effect correlation is reliable (above a certain threshold)
the cause schema becomes the schema that outputs oy(t), namely Sy. and the ”effect”schema
becomes the schema that outputs ox(t), namely Sx. Hence, giving rise to the construction of a new
predictive schema PX,Y . SBL also constructs its corresponding dual schema SY,X in parallel to be
able to re-construct a previous successful pattern of interaction.
To facilitate understanding let us first analyze a simplified case. Consider five schemas, three of
which are motor schemas A, B, C and two of which are perceptual schemas 1, 2. Suppose there is
only a cause-effect relation between motor schema B and perceptual schema 1 with a delay τ2; and
a cause-effect relation between motor schema C and perceptual schema 2 with a delay τ1. Figure
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Figure 2: Representation of the cause-effect relations in the simplified example con-
sisting of five schemas, three of which are motor schemas A, B, C and two of which are
perceptual schemas 1, 2. The black squares represent the existence of a cause-effect relation
between the respective motor and perceptual schemas with that specific delay τi. On the
other hand, the white squares represent the lack of any cause-effect relation between the
respective motor and perceptual schemas.
2 represents the cause-effect relations among these three motor schemas and these two perceptual
schemas. To farther exemplify suppose that perceptual schema 1 is sensory feedback from the
grip and perceptual schema 2 corresponds to ”target on view field”. On the other hand, suppose
that motor schema A is sidestep, motor schema B corresponds to open grip, and motor schema C
corresponds to ”lunge”. It should be clear in this example that there is only a cause-effect relation
between the schemas ”open grip” and sensory feedback from the grip with a certain time delay;
and the schemas sidestep and ”target on view field” with a probably different time delay.
4.2 Schema Construction: open-ended self-growing
In general, to construct a new schema, three aspects must be determined, namely: the trigger
event (when), the components (what), and the topological configuration (how). First of all, the
agent must realize the trigger event when there is the need to construct (a) new schema(s). In
this regard, both the prediction error (incoherence) and the performance error will serve as the
triggers under specific conditions, as it will be explained below. The next step consists of realizing
what can take the system back to coherence and closer to the goal. This implies determining
what components and in which topological configuration will make up the new schema. As already
explained, SBL attempts to maximize coherence, that is, reduce the prediction error, and, at the
same time, maximize performance. In this regard, structural learning processes are triggered when
specific unexpected patterns of interaction occur, either due to a new cause-effect relation or to a
an incoherence. Figure 3 details the different conditions that may take place.
An unexpected event can be associated with the agent getting closer (C.b) or getting away
from a specific goal (C.b’). In the first case (C.b), the system should attempt to ”record” the
”configuration” that gave rise to that interaction, such as is the case in learning to detour that will
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Figure 3: Unexpected can be generated in two cases: (C.c) by a new predictive
cause-effect relation discovered by the cause-effect dynamics (as described in section 4.1);
and (C.a) when there is an incoherence, that is, the predictive response does not match the
actual observed response (ox(t+ 1)− oˆx,y(t+ 1)) 6= 0 and, at the same time, either the cause
or the effect schemas are inactive, i.e., oy(t) = ] or ox(t+ 1) = ].
be explained in section 6.5 in Paper II of this series. Whereas in the case (C.b’), the system must
make sure to avoid the current pattern of interaction and re-construct some previous successful
pattern (or construct alternative strategies (Corbacho, 1997)). Learning after failure for break-out
corresponds to this case since the failure causes a prediction error due to the inactivation of the
effect schema. In this case, previous successful pattern re-construction is necessary to achieve the
goal as it will be explained in section 7.4 in Paper III in this series. Other cases in the figure are
included in Corbacho and Arbib (2019).
Constructing new predictive schema P x,y,v: As already explained in section 3.2, once the
effect Sx and the cause schema Sy have been determined, the predictive schema behavioral specifi-
cation is defined by a mapping Mx,yP parametrized by W
x,y
P (t), as defined in equation 1. The new
predictive schema recruits the dormant structure and parametrizes Wx,yP (t) accordingly. Next we
define the general constructive equation.
ix,y1 (t) = o
x(t)
ix,y2 (t) = o
y,x(t)
ix,y3 (t) = o
v(t)
oˆx,y(t+ 1) = E[ox(t+ 1)|ox(t), oy,x(t), ov(t)]
where adaptation of Wx,y,vP is driven by the minimization of d(o
x(t + 1), oˆx,y(t + 1)). Also its
dual schema Sy,x gets constructed in parallel. The dual schema requires as input a goal pattern
that must be provided by a goal schema. In this regard, the goal schema Gz,x learned in previous
successful interactions outputs the ”goal” activity pattern for schema Sx as already explained in
section 3.3.
Constructing new dual schema Sy,x,v: This new schema’s role is to produce the ”optimal”
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pattern of activity in the cause schema Sy that will in turn give rise, though the cause-effect dy-
namics, to the goal pattern of activity in the effect schema Sx The components of the new schema
Sy,x are as follows:
iy,x1 (t) = o
x(t)
iy,x2 (t) = o
∗z,x(t+ 1)
iy,x3 (t) = o
v(t)
< Oplist >: the output port is of the same type as Sy input port and connected to the
re-constructed cause schema Sy
′
(defined below).
< Behavior >: the system must produce a modulatory activity pattern input to the re-
constructed cause schema Sy
′
(defined below) such that it will make the pattern ox(t) in the effect
schema Sx get closer to the goal pattern o∗z,x(t+1) set by the goal schema Gz,x. Where adaptation
of Wy,x,vP is driven by the minimization of d(o
∗z,x(t + 1), ox(t + 1)). This is analogous to learning
the inverse model in distal supervised learning (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992).
The cause schema Sy receives a new modulatory input from the dual schema Sy,x since the dual
schema outputs an optimal pattern of activity for Sy under a specific context. A particular context
conditions a specific optimal pattern (Torralba, 2003). These modulatory loops have been shown
to have already evolved in lower vertebrates (Ewert, et al., 2006). Hence, the cause schema is
reconstructed to include this new modulatory input.
Reconstruct Cause Schema Sy into Sy
′
: Cause schema Sy is reconstructed to incorporate
a new modulatory input port from the newly constructed dual schema (represented by dashed lines
in Figures 9 and 10). In turn, it reconstructs its behavioral specification as now it has to take into
account this new instantiated modulatory signal.
< Iplist >: They are the same as in Sy (i.e. k input ports) in addition to a newly instantiated
modulatory input port of the same type and connected to the output port of the dual schema Sy,x,
namely,
iy
′
k+1(t) = o
y,x(t) (18)
< Behavior >: The behavioral specification remains the same as in Sy but two extra assignment
expressions are instantiated at the very end of the behavioral specification to take into account
the new modulatory input signal that serves to reconstruct the pattern of activity proven to be
successful in the past in similar conditions, namely,
oy
′
(t) =
{
iy
′
k+1(t) if i
y′
k+1(t) 6= ]
oy(t) otherwise
That is, if there is no modulatory input, the output port assignment remains as in the original
schema Sy. Yet, if there is any modulatory input, then the output port assignment corresponds
to the input objective modulatory input. As already expressed, for the sake of clarity and simpli-
fication for this article, we assume that only one predictive and its corresponding dual schema are
instantiated for each specific active motor schema. Hence, avoiding issues of integration (linear or
nonlinear). Thus, oˆx(t) = oˆx,y(t), oy(t) = oy,x(t) and equation 12 can be simplified to reflect this
assumption.
In summary, a global picture of this process of schema construction is depicted in Figure 4. It
includes the predictive schema P x,y and its associated dual schema Sy,x, as well as the involved
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Figure 4: Generalized process of schema(s) construction. Construction of the new
predictive schema P x,y and its dual schema Sy,x. In turn, cause schema Sy is adapted to
instantiate a modulatory input port from the dual schema (represented by dashed lines).
This in turn adapts its behavioral specification as now it has to take into account this
instantiated modulatory signal.
goal schema Gz,x.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents self-constructive AI as a general framework that allows for the autonomous
construction of increasingly functionality in AI systems. Hence, SCAI is one possible architecture
for Artificial General Intelligence since it is capable to develop qualitative new different behav-
iors not previously imagined by its designers. In order to do so, it incorporates structural learning
which allows the construction of new structures (schemas) based on previous structural components
(schemas). The general idea behind the SCAI framework is to start with less pre-designed struc-
tures and functions and more powerful and general constructive mechanisms so that autonomous
development can take place.
Self-constructive can be achieved by three central principles of organization, namely: Self-
growing implies that the system autonomously and increasingly is able to construct new useful
patterns of interaction with its environment and reflecting those in new internal representations.
Self-experimental: the agent can also perform experiments with the environment and also internal
experiments (mental simulation) with many previously constructed models that allow to predict
and anticipate the results of its actions, thus allowing to improve its decision making by matching
the expected results with the desired results. Finally self-repairing implies that the agent is able
to recover from possible break-outs in any of its functionality by constructing internal models that
allow to model and later re-construct previously successful patterns of interaction. Hence, giving
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rise to more flexible and robust agents.
We propose SBL as one possible formalization for the SCAI constructive architecture. SBL
allows for the construction of predictive (cf. forward internal models) and its dual schemas as active
processes capturing relevant patterns of interaction; and we suggest that intelligence emerges from
myriads of these patterns as well as their dual predictive internal models associated. This paper also
provides a pseudo-algorithm for SCAI. For a framework to be general it must include perception,
sensory integration, decision making, action and adaptation, which must be intrinsic to all the
previous components. Integration from multisensorial to sensorimotor transformations is critical.
Decision of (near) optimal actions must not only take into account the current inflow of information
but it must also simulate the expected outcome of the different possible actions in order to select
(and plan) the most valuable one. Also, for perception to be general, it must be able to cope with
different kinds of receptors, explore and discover different manifolds in receptor space, different
relations, measure their value, store them and relate them to expectations. Similarly, for action to
be general, it must be able to cope with different kinds of effectors, explore and discover different
manifolds in effector space, different spatiotemporal relations, measure their value, store them and
relate them to expectations. Finally, for an AI framework to be general, it must allow for different
tasks within the same environment (e.g. incremental navigation) as well as completely different
environments and domains of interaction. To demonstrate the generality of the SCAI framework
we provide three different test cases in this paper series. One is adaptive navigation (Paper II)
and another one in resilient motor control (Paper III). A fourth paper in these series presents a
case in Business Intelligence to show the generality of the SCAI framework across widely different
environments.
5.1 Discussion
This paper definitely emphasizes the importance of the closed interaction loop between the agent
and its environment in a dynamical way. Many researchers have clarified that intelligence resides in
the circular relationship between the mind of an individual organism, its body, and the environment
(Beer, 1995; Chiel & Beer, 1997; Nolfi & Floreano, 2000; Nolfi, Ikegami, & Tani, 2008; Pfeifer &
Scheier, 1999; Tani, 1996; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). Also, an increasing number of
research directions emphasize the embodied agent framework (Brooks & Stein, 1994; Husbands,
2009; Lund, 2014). In this regard, different cognitive theories also emphasize the dynamic and
interactive role of the brain and the environment (Barandian, & Moreno, 2006; Clark, 1997; Clark,
& Grush, 1999; Di Paolo, Barandiaran, Beaton & Buhrmann, 2013; Nolfi & Tani, 1999; van Duijn,
Keijzer, & Franken, 2006; Vakarelov, 2011).
This paper has also emphasized the individual’s self-construction of reality, yet the construction
of reality has important social implications in higher species (Arbib & Hesse, 1986; Butz, 2008;
Piaget, 1954). The agent lives in a society and the interaction with other agents plays an important
role in the agent dynamics. Future work involves the extension to include social interactions. In
this regard, an increasing body of research deals with the formalization of social interactions. For
instance, Di Paolo & De Jaegher (2012) introduce the interactive brain hypothesis in order to
map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neuronal processes. This
hypothesis, among other things, states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in
both the development and current function of social brain mechanisms, even in cases where social
understanding happens in the absence of immediate interaction. In this regard, mirror neurons
have been related to what to expect from other agents by direct observation, that is, they are
related to the expectation of other agents’ actions. Hence, internal forward models have also been
related to mirror neuron systems (Orzop, Kawato & Arbib, 2013; Orzop, Wolpert & Kawato, 2005;
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Tani, Ito, & Sugita, 2004) and predictive coding (Grossberg, 2009; Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007).
Also, in the field of autonomous robots, Steels and Spranger (2008) explain how autonomous robots
can construct a body image of themselves and how this internal mental model, in turn, can help
in motor control, planning and in recognizing actions performed by other agents. Bostrom (2014)
poses the implications of a futuristic superintelligence and the possible threats for the society if
certain principles can not be guaranteed. Thus, it will be a very profound challenge to develop
frameworks such as SCAI for general artificial intelligence while making sure that certain ethical
principles are guaranteed.
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